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In recent years domestic airlines have increasingly considered
merger as a solution to numerous problems. In this article Mr.
Samuel Reid and Mr. James Mohrfeld examine the actual effects
of mergers in the airline field. Their conclusions, based on an
analysis of available statistics, is that merger may not be the best
solution to all airline problems.
I. INTRODUCTION
D URING the past few years the domestic airlines have dis-
played an increased propensity to seek approval for business
combinations as a means of correcting performance patterns The
rationale for this movement is familiar to observers of the busi-
ness scene: that is, the persistent optimism that somehow mergers
will permit firms to realize certain scale economies, with increased
efficiency resulting in higher levels of profitability.
An approved merger will increase the size (and scale) of the
surviving firm instantaneously; there are, however, many examples
of firms that have failed to realize the expected benefits associated
* B.S., M.S., Ph.D., St. Louis University; author of MERGERS, MANAGERS, AND
THE ECONOMY (McGraw Hill Book Co., 1968). Mr. Reid is a Professor of Busi-
ness and Economics at the University of New Hampshire, Durham, New Hamp-
shire.
** B.S., Iowa State University; M.B.A., University of New Hampshire. Mr.
Mohrfeld is currently a doctoral student at the Graduate School of Business
Administration at the University of Texas, Austin, Texas.
1 Early in 1971, the Civil Aeronautics Board approved the American Airlines-
Trans Caribbean merger. Hearings on the American Airlines-Western Airlines
merger were concluded in the summer of 1971. Other applications included Na-
tional-Northwest and Northeast-Delta. Also, Pan Am and TWA held merger
discussions.
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with large scale. The classic example in the transportation indus-
try is the infamous Penn-Central merger which has become the
largest single economic failure in the history of business and com-
mercial affairs.
In the thirty-five years of regulation by the Civil Aeronautics
Board, the number of domestic trunk airlines has declined from
thirty-eight to the current low of ten carriers. Thus merger activity
is not a new development in this industry; however, most of the
previously approved mergers were considerably smaller than those
recently proposed by airline management. The impetus for the
proposed airline mergers appears to center around the declining
profits (or substantial losses) recorded by some carriers during
the 1969-1970 recession period. While there are alternative solu-
tions, the traditional merger approach has generated some man-
agerial support which has been reinforced by the approval of the
Department of Transportation
The purpose of this study is to determine if there is an empirical
and logical basis for support of airline combinations and to ex-
plore other viable alternatives available to firms in this highly
concentrated industry. Since approved mergers would increase
the scale of existing carriers, primary emphasis will focus on the
size-profitability hypothesis as it relates to this particular industry
during the past decade.
II. SIZE AND PROFITABILITY
The suggestion that mere size influences profitability has long
intrigued economists, as evidenced by the periodic and increasing
number of studies of the subject.' There has been a lack of con-
sensus among researchers on the validity of the size-profitability
'The Department of Transportation approved the application of American
Airlines and Western Airlines to merge. The Department of Justice opposed the
merger on anticompetitive grounds and the CAB rejected the application in 1972.
1W. BAUMAL, BUSINESS, BEHAVIOR, VALUE, AND GROWTH (1959); N. COL-
LINS & L. PRESTON, CONCENTRATION AND PRICE-COST MARGINS IN MANUFACTUR-
ING (1968); W. CRUM, CORPORATE SIZE AND EARNING POWER (1939); R. EP-
STEIN, INDUSTRIAL PROFITS IN THE UNITED STATES (1939); H. STEKLER, PROFIT-
ABILITY AND SIZE OF FIRM (1963); Alexander, The Effect of Size of Manufac-
turing Corporation on the Distribution of the Rate of Return, 20 REV. OF ECON.
& STATISTICS 229-35 (1949); Hall & Weiss, Firm Size and Profitability, 49 REV.
OF ECON. & STATISTICS 319-31 (1967); Marcus, Profitability and Size of Firm,
51 REV. OF ECON. & STATISTICS 104-07 (1969); McConnel, Corporate Earnings
by Size of Firm, 25 SURVEY OF CURRENT Bus. 6-12 (1945).
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hypothesis. It appears that the level of industry aggregation, time
period, number of firms, and other factors have contributed to the
mixed results. In addition, primary emphasis has centered on the
unregulated industrial areas where the quality of data is more
serendipitous and diversification more prevalent than in regulated
sectors of the economy. Thus an examination of the size-profit-
ability hypothesis in the domestic trunk airlines industry has the
advantage of data accessibility and homogeneity with results more
germane than those of the generalized industrial studies. The fol-
lowing study presents an analysis of the effects of airline firm
size on such parameters as profit, expenses and other measures of
efficiency.
III. A TEST OF THE SIZE-PROFITABILITY HYPOTHESIS
As APPLIED TO THE AIRLINES
The domestic trunk airlines industry is highly concentrated with
the four largest firms controlling about 70 percent of the assets.
This study examines these four firms and the other seven carriers
that were operating in the eleven year period, 1960-1970." For
purposes of analysis, the smaller firms are divided into two groups,
the medium four and the small three.'
In order to obtain a measure by which profit, revenue, and
expenses can be evaluated as a function of size, the operational
parameters are expressed on a per unit basis-the unit being a
"revenue ton-mile."' This unit is preferable to "available ton-
miles" because it measures actual rather than potential airline
performance. In order to determine the effect of size on each
parameter, regression equations have been computed which are
mathematical models of the relationship betwen size and each
parameter." These regression equations describe the relationship
of size to a parameter (see Table 1); size is measured either as
'The domestic trunk airlines listed according to size are: United, American,
TWA, Eastern, Delta, Northwest, National, Western, Braniff, Continental, and
Northeast.
IBased on 1960-1970 operating revenue, the large airlines (1-4) held 68.2
percent of the market while the medium-sized firms (5-8) held 22.2 percent,
and the smaller firms (9-11) had the remaining 9.6 percent. Statistics were com-
piled using data published by the Civil Aeronautics Board and MOODY'S HAND-
BOOK OF COMMON STOCKS.
o A revenue ton-mile is a ton of cargo carried a mile.
7 The size data were transformed into natural logarithms.
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operating revenue or total assets. Both size parameters reveal
similar trends, therefore the graphs and the table utilize operating
revenue and a table in the Appendix utilizes total assets. Two
regression equations were computed for each parameter, first order
and second order (logarithmic). First order equations are of the
Y=B0 +B, (L.X) when Y is the magnitude of the specific parameter
and X is airline size. Second order equations are of the form
Y=Bo+B 1 (L.X) +B(L.X)'. The higher coefficient of determina-
tion (R' ) indicates the equation (first or second order) which is
the better model for each parameter. Figures 1 and 2 are graphs
of the better models.
A. Size and Profitability
An examination of the data presented in Table 1 and Figures
1 and 2 reveals that increasing the size of an airline firm beyond
the point of minimum unit operating expense does not result in
increased profitability. If the firm's size is already at or beyond
the point of maximum unit profit, reductions in unit operating
expense do not result in increased unit profit because unit revenue
resulting from growth decreases at a greater rate than unit ex-
penses. Total profitability also decreases with any substantial
growth beyond the point of maximum unit profit because unit
operating profit decreases faster than size increases, whether size
is measured by operating revenue, revenue ton-miles, or total assets.
B. Size and Cost
One would expect the unit operating expense curve to decrease
with size if benefits due to large size exist in the industry. Unit
costs should move downward if stage length (length of flight from
takeoff to landing) increases, as is the case for the large airlines.!
Nevertheless, this phenomenon has not been revealed in this study.
The data underlying Figure 1 illustrate that unit operating expense
is lowest for a range between the 1960-1970 mean size of the
medium group of carriers and the four largest airlines firms. In
relation to current firm size, this minimum point is slightly above
the 1969-70 mean size of the medium four airlines.!
I The mean stage length of the large four airlines is 536 miles, the medium
four airlines is 402 miles, and the small three airlines is 385 miles (during the
period 1960-1970).
Mean size (operating revenue) of the three airline groups during the period
1960-1970 was: large four-7.OxIO', medium four-2.3xl0', and the small three-
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A breakdown of unit operating expenses reveals that six of the
seven individual unit expense curves have the same shape as the
unit operating expense curve." Only the depreciation and amortiza-
tion curve goes down as size increases. Therefore, no one indi-
vidual expense controls the shape of the overall unit operating
expense curve. The analysis indicates that the large airlines do not
operate as efficiently as the smaller airlines and that the expected
benefits of size have not been attained in the domestic trunk air-
line industry in the decade of 1960-1970.
C. Further Analysis
Load factor (percentage of capacity utilized) is critical to the
profitability and unit cost measures of airline performance. The
increased costs incurred in handling a higher load factor are
almost negligible because fixed costs per flight far exceed variable
costs; however, an increased load factor causes unit operating
revenue to increase faster than unit costs, contributing to increased
profitability. During this study period, load factor and profitability
(NI/TA) reached maximum values at the same airline size,
demonstrating that the larger airlines are unable to fill their flights
as well as the medium-sized airlines. Thus the size-load factor
relationship is a partial explanation for the existence of disecon-
omies of scale of the large airlines.
Another way of evaluating a firm's relative success is to adopt
the point of view of the stockholders, particularly those who invest
for long-term gain. Earnings per share of the airlines follow a
curve similar to that of profitability (see Figure 2). Both curves
attain a maximum point well below the current mean size of the
largest airlines. This finding strongly suggests that the proposed
mergers involving any of the large airlines do not appear to be in
the best interests of the public and the airlines and their share-
holders.
IV. REGULATORY IMPLICATIONS
The public policy implications of this research clearly indicate
1.3x10 8 . During the period 1969-70 the mean size was: large four-11.5xl08 ,
medium four-3.8x0 8 , and the small three-2.4xl08 .
"°The seven individual unit operating expenses are: flying operations, main-
tenance, passenger service, aircraft and traffic servicing, promotion and sales,
general and administrative, and amortization and depreciation.
19731
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that the merger alternative is a suboptimal solution to the problems
confronting the domestic trunk airlines industry. There are other
alternatives which should be explored and encouraged. Price
competition designed to increase load factors for the industry (as
well as the individual firms) and deconcentration policies that
would reduce the largest firms to a more efficient and profitable
scale of operation should be considered.
A. The Load Factor and Price and Nonprice Competition
In addition to entry and mergers, the CAB regulates prices and
some services." This regulatory agency apparently favors a target-
return pricing which contributes to a reduction in load factors in
periods of declining business. As noted in Fortune, "CAB deci-
sions have encouraged airline executives in a mistaken policy of
seeking higher fares when business falls off in order to keep returns
up--instead of cutting fares to attract new customers.""2 Richard
E. Caves recognized this regulatory problem; he stated:
... regulation that aims at normal profits implies a movement of
prices counter to the business cycle and counter to most other
prices in the economy. Meaningless shifts of relative prices would
occur-shifts that might draw too many resources into the regu-
lated industry in time of prosperity only to force the regulatory
authority to raise prices to guarantee a normal reward in time of
recession."
As load factors and profits declined during the last recession,
the airlines clamored for higher fares. Starting in early 1969, the
CAB granted several increases. Since then, air fares have increased
about 15 percent and load factors have declined. The fare in-
creases were in part a consequence of underutilized capacity and
at the same time a cause of lower utilization. Fortune has noted
11 In approving the fare increase, the Board, for the first time, established a
standard for equipment utilization. Major airlines are now expected to fill at
least 52.5 percent of their seats on an industry wide average, and the figure will
rise to 55 percent in 1973. Thus, a new regulatory twist has been instituted sans
competitive pricing.
12 FORTUNE, July, 1971, at 145. It is worth noting that international fares,
which have displayed a downward movement (and increased load factors) are
not under the CAB's control.
13 Caves, Performance, Structure, and the Goals of Civil Aeronautics Board
Regulation, in THE CRISIS OF THE REGULATORY COMMISSION 148 (P. MacAvoy
ed. 1970). For a more complete discussion of the problems of airline regulation
see R. CAVES, AIR TRANSPORT AND ITS REGULATORS: AN INDUSTRY STUDY (1962).
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that "After so many years of anticompetitive regulation, not many
airline executives tend to think in terms of trying to attract addi-
tional customers with lower fares.""
In conclusion, it appears that increased pricing freedom coupled
with a restrictive merger policy by the CAB is the most beneficial
course for both private and public interests. Target rates of return
should be abolished in pricing and service decisions in the interest
of all concerned. Richard E. Caves, in a prophetic and perceptive
observation, stated:
The variety of services offered to travelers can be improved
somewhat if the Board allows the carriers more freedom to experi-
ment, but the Board's ultimate fear of subnormal profits will re-
main. The number of carriers may continue to shrink, even if
profits for the industry as a whole average better than normal,
unless the Board sees the long-run danger in mergers."
The evidence rather strongly suggests that the regulatory course
in this industry should be a strict policy regarding merger activity
and a more relaxed policy on pricing practices designed to in-
crease the load factor.
B. Airline Deconcentration
Rather than encouraging a higher level of concentration in the
domestic airlines industry, a program of periodic and orderly spin-
offs of components of the larger firms appears to be in the interests
of the airlines as well as the public. Proposals of this type generally
are greeted with minimum enthusiasm, yet the fact remains that
diseconomies of scale are as real and as possible to attain as
economies of scale. 6 This factor appears to have become obscured
"See note 12 supra at 146. In the absence of price competition, most of the
firm rivalry has been of the nonprice variety as noted by Alfred E. Kahn: "In
part because the doors to price competition are closed, airline companies com-
pete very strenuously among themselves in the quality of service they offer-
most notably in adopting the most modern and attractive equipment and in the
frequency with which they schedule flights, but also in providing comfort, attrac-
tive hostesses, in-flight entertainment, food and drink." Kahn, The Economics
of Regulation: Principles and Institutions, 2 INSTITUTIONAL ISSUES 211 (1971).
As noted by Kahn, the expenses in the latter category alone are not negligible,
since it is reported that an airline spends more than $30 for food and drink for
each transatlantic first-class passenger.
'1 Caves, Performance, Structure, and the Goals of Civil Aeronautics Board
Regulation, in THE CRISIS OF THE REGULATORY COMMISSION 149 (P. MacAvoy
ed. 1970).
1Some belated recognition of this factor is evident in the announcement by
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in the rhetoric surrounding the discussions of relative firm size in
all segments of the economy.
V. SUMMARY
In the past few years, several of the domestic trunk airlines have
proposed mergers as the solution for their declining profits (or
losses). A study of the historical performances of the industry
during the 1960-70 period reveals that as the size of an airline
increases beyond that of the medium four airlines, profitability
decreases. This finding indicates that increases in firm size resulting
from mergers are a suboptimal solution to the airlines profits
problems. In this industry, variable cost is small compared to fixed
costs; therefore, the most logical solution to declining profits is
price competition aimed at increasing industry and individual air-
line load factor, resulting in increased profits. In addition, regu-
lators and managers of the large airlines should consider spin-offs
designed to achieve a firm size more compatable with increased
efficiency and profitability.
United States, the largest firm in the industry, that it is drastically decentralizing
decision-making and operating responsibility. Three operating divisions have been
established-each of which by itself would rank in size among the top half dozen
or so airlines. The president of the firm listed the following advantages of the
decentralization: shorter lines of authority, greater field autonomy, increased
stress on the profit center concept and cost control. See Wall Street Journal,
Oct. 1, 1971, at 6. Deconcentration is a step beyond decentralization since inde-
pendence is also achieved in addition to the other benefits.
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AIRLINE CAPACITY AGREEMENTS
CORRECTING A REGULATORY IMPERFECTIONt
William A. Jordan*
In this article, Professor William Jordan presents a convincing
argument that airlines can charge lower fares and still increase
profits by reducing flight frequencies. To accomplish this result he
urges CAB support for capacity agreements between airlines. His
analysis includes a review of previous capacity agreements, an
examination of the actual effects of these agreements and finally
predictions based on the future application of capacity agreements.
E XCESS capacity has become a chronic affliction of the regu-
lated interstate airlines of the United States. The revenue
passenger load factors of the domestic trunk airlines have grad-
ually fallen from between 80 to 90 percent during World War II,
down through the 70 to 60 percent range during the 1950's, and
on to the 50 percent level during the late 1960's.1 Superimposed
on this secular trend has been a cyclical fluctuation which has
yielded lower than usual load factors during the late 1940's, the
early 1960's, and most recently, in 1969-71 when passenger load
factors fell below 50 percent-even while aircraft were being
operated with large lounges and relatively low seating densities.!
Whether one looks upon this situation as an optimist and says
t A preliminary version of this article was presented on September 22, 1972,
at the Federal Bar Association Conference, Air Transport Regulation. The re-
search was conducted under a grant from the York University Transport Cen-
tre. Neither organization, of course, is responsible for the contents of this article.
* B.S., Antioch College; M.S., Columbia University; Ph.D., U.C.L.A. Mr.
Jordan is an Associate Professor of Managerial Economics at York University,
Toronto, Canada.
CAB, HANDBOOK OF AIRLINE STATISTICS 26 (1971 ed.).
Id. See also CAB, Am CARRIER TRAFFIC STATISTICS, XVII-12, at 2 (1971);
CAB Order No. 72-5-101, at 7-37 (May 26, 1972). In 1971 the trunk carriers'
load factor reached an all time low of 48.3 percent.
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that the aircraft were almost half full, or as a pessimist who points
out that they were more than half empty, the fact is that a great
deal of the trunk carriers' production has not been utilized. As a
result, the cost of the air transportation services actually con-
sumed has been substantially increased.
No one will argue that the airlines are incapable of achieving
higher than 50 percent passenger load factors. Indeed, the Civil
Aeronautics Board (CAB) has set a "long-range passenger load
factor standard" of 55.0 percent for the trunk carriers,' and many
would agree that the 60 to 65 percent load factors of the late
1950's provided high quality passenger service in addition to a
more efficient utilization of airline resources. Unfortunately, while
it is easy to agree on the desirability of higher load factors, it is
very difficult to achieve them.
The airlines are painfully aware of the effects of excess capacity
on their profits. In addition, the CAB, Federal Aviation Adminis-
tration (FAA), operators of large metropolitan airports, and
others have come to recognize that the combination of substantial
traffic growth and decreased load factors wastes resources, in-
creases pollution, and promotes congestion in airway and airport
facilities. As a result, a new phenomenon-the airline capacity
agreement-has been slowly developing in the United States since
1968. Operationally, these agreements have come into existence
when the airlines serving some airport or operating between cer-
tain cities have requested and received CAB authorization to dis-
cuss schedule frequencies free of antitrust constraints. When such
discussions are successful, and the resulting agreements are ap-
proved by the CAB, a reduced number of schedules are allocated
among and operated by the participating carriers, thereby reducing
excess capacity.
The purposes of this article are to outline the major reason for
the airlines' chronic excess capacity; describe the development of
capacity agreements in the U.S. largely in response to this excess
capacity; provide evidence regarding the effects of various agree-
ments; and predict the likely long-run results of the widespread
implementation of capacity agreements. Hopefully this will provide
interested readers with a better understanding of this important
innovation, will help decision makers avoid certain pitfalls asso-
SCAB Order No. 71-4-54, at 45 (April 9, 1971).
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ciated with the various kinds of capacity agreements, and will
indicate what can realistically be expected from such agreements.
I. THE SOURCE OF EXCESS CAPACITY
Excess capacity among the regulated airlines is largely due to a
fundamental imperfection in the CAB's regulatory practices. The
Civil Aeronautics Act of 1938" gave the CAB full discretionary
power over airline entry/exit and prices, but only limited power
over the quality of service provided by the airlines.' During the
past 35 years the Board has exercised strict regulation of airline
pricing so that all the airlines have charged essentially the same
prices for comparable services.' The Board could have adopted
similar strict policies to limit the number of carriers allowed to
serve each route. For example, it could have allocated routes among
the trunk carriers so that, with a few exceptions, only one carrier
would have been authorized to provide the desired service between
each city pair. If this had been done, and if carriers had been
selected on the basis of which one was capable of providing the
optimal type and amount of service at the lowest marginal cost,
industry profits could have been maximized and then allocated
among all the regulated airlines. It happened, however, that the
Board did not do this. Instead, it has allowed several carriers to
operate between most of the larger cities, with each carrier's profits
being substantially influenced by the share of total traffic it could
attract in each city pair, rather than by total industry profits. Since
CAB regulation has essentially controlled prices but not service
quality, the airlines have turned to service-quality rivalry as the
means of winning traffic from each other, and this is the source
of the excess capacity problem.'
Large-scale service-quality rivalry has resulted in the airlines
utilizing increased amounts of capital and labor inputs to produce
given amounts of ever higher quality output. Some of the results
and costs of service-quality rivalry can be seen in in-flight meal
services and entertainment, large aircraft lounges, increased leg
4 52 Stat. 973.
' W. JORDAN, AIRLINE REGULATION IN AMERICA: EFFECTS AND IMPERFECTIONS
2-4 (1970).
a Id. at 57-72.
'Id. at 228-33.
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room, downtown ticket offices, fast baggage handling, comfortable
terminal facilities, and so forth, that have become accepted fea-
tures of air transportation. More importantly, service-quality rivalry
has played a fundamental role in increasing schedule frequency'
(and thus the number of aircraft operated by the carriers), and
in causing the frequent reequipment cycles which introduced pres-
surized, piston-powered aircraft from 1946 to 1952, jet aircraft
starting in 1958, and wide-bodied aircraft beginning in 1970."
A simple illustration will be useful in providing some idea of the
resources represented by the current fleet of trunk carrier aircraft
and, from this, an indication of the costs incurred when an ex-
cessive number of these aircraft are purchased, underutilized and
then retired before the end of their economically useful lives.
Consider a somewhat above-average North American suburban
house priced at $50,000. This house can provide comfortable ac-
commodations for five persons, two cars and assorted pets for at
least 30 years (the length of the mortgage) and probably for 50
years or more. It would take about 380 of these houses to equal
the value of a DC-10 (about $19 million), and around 500
houses would account for one Boeing 747 (priced around $25
million). Consider further that as of September 30, 1972, the
total original (nondepreciated) value of all flight equipment oper-
ated by the domestic trunk carriers was $9.383 billion, equiva-
lent in value to 187,660 of our above-average suburban houses.
Now, a 25 percent increase in passenger load factor (from, say,
52 percent to 65 percent) would allow the same number of pas-
sengers to be accommodated by a 20 percent smaller trunk air-
craft fleet. This would mean a reduction in the value of the
required stock of aircraft by $1.877 billion (to $7.506 billion),
equivalent to about 37,500 houses, capable of accommodating
187,500 persons.
Another long-term reduction in resource requirements could be
8See, e.g., CAB Order No. 71-4-54, at 5 (April 9, 1971).
1 The rapid and extensive adoption of these first two aircraft innovations
under regulation is summarized in W. JORDAN, AIRLINE REGULATION IN AMERICA:
EFFECTS AND IMPERFECTIONS 36-44 (1970).
'"CAB, AIR CARRIER FINANCIAL STATISTICS, XX-3, at 32 (1972). Note that
inflation serves to decrease the original value relative to full replacement value
of the current aircraft stock. Thus, the following example somewhat understates
the impact on the economy of excess aircraft capacity.
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achieved by extending the useful lives of aircraft by 25 percent
(say, from an average of 14 years to 17 /2 years). Had both the
load factor increase and longer aircraft lives been in effect since
jet aircraft were introduced in late 1958, the current average
annual rate of replacement outlays to maintain the smaller stock
of aircraft would be reduced from $670 million ($9.383 billion
- 14) to $429 million ($7.506 - 17.5)-that is, by about $241
million per year. This would release resources that could be used
to build 4,820 houses each year, providing better housing for
24,100 persons. Cumulating this flow of construction over a 17 -
year aircraft replacement cycle yields an increase in the stock of
housing by 84,350 units, while over a 50-year house replacement
cycle the housing stock would be increased by 241,000 units. This
would mean better housing for about 422,000 upper-middle class
persons over the 17V 2-year period, and 1.2 million persons for
the 50-year period. Furthermore, many more than 1.2 million
persons would have better housing as less affluent individuals in
turn move into better housing as it is vacated by wealthier families
moving into the new houses.
Obviously, the above illustration is unrealistic in that resources
made available by reducing the number of aircraft produced would
not all be funneled into middle-class housing. Instead, they would
be utilized in many diverse parts of the economy. But, this simple
illustration does indicate that two quite feasible changes in aircraft
utilization would have important effects on overall resource alloca-
tion and production in the economy. Finally, keep in mind that
the above illustration merely refers to resources diverted from
aircraft construction. It does not include the resources required to
maintain and operate these additional aircraft.
Clearly, an institutional environment that encourages the exces-
sive purchase, underutilization and early retirement of such a
valuable asset as aircraft greatly increases the costs of airline pro-
duction. Yet this is precisely the result of the service-quality rivalry
that has developed in the CAB regulatory environment, and it is
the undesirable results of this situation that airline capacity agree-
ments have been mainly designed to change, given the existing
reluctance to change the fundamental regulatory source of excess
capacity.1'
"The following quotation shows the emphasis which the airlines place on
1973]
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II. DEVELOPMENT OF CAPACITY AGREEMENTS
As indicated above, a necessary condition for capacity agree-
ments is for the Board first to give two or more carriers permission
to meet to discuss flight schedules, and then to approve any re-
sulting agreements under section 412 of the Act. " Given these
explicit Board authorizations, section 414 of the Act ' exempts
these cartelizing actions of the airlines from the provisions of the
"antitrust laws" and, therefore, makes the agreements legally en-
forceable.' Clearly, if these agreements serve to reduce the total
number of flight schedules or available seat-miles operated by the
parties and to allocate the agreed upon total among the carriers,
an important aspect of service-quality rivalry is removed from
independent carrier action and is relegated to the rivalry of the
negotiating table.
A. Agreements Concerning Airports
The earliest capacity agreements concerned flight frequencies
at specific airports. On July 24, 1968, TWA requested permission
from the CAB for the airlines to hold discussions regarding air
traffic congestion at Chicago, Los Angeles, New York and Washing-
ton, D.C." The CAB authorized these discussions just two days
following TWA's request, " and about three weeks later the FAA
gave direction to these discussions by proposing an amendment to
the Federal Aviation Regulations which would set restrictions on
modernizing their aircraft fleets: "In a recent McGraw-Hill study of the nation's
plant and equipment, the airlines emerged as the most modern of all industries
surveyed. Airlines were found to have the largest share of plant and equipment
less than five years old (60 per cent), the smallest percentage of technologically
outmoded plant and equipment (1 per cent), and the largest share of 1972 cap-
ital spending budgets going for electronic equipment (88 per cent)." Newsletter
to the Stockholders of UAL, Inc., from Edward E. Carlson, at 2 (April 26, 1973).
Given the above analysis, it is not clear that this is a desirable situation for a
significant portion of the U.S. population.
"Federal Aviation Act of 1958, § 412, 49 U.S.C. § 1382 (1970).
1"49 U.S.C. § 1384.
'" CAB Order No. 70-11-35, at 2n. (November 6, 1970). A cartel is defined
as a group of producers who form an agreement to act together. See G. STIrLER,
THE THEORY OF PRICE 230 (1966). The specific provision to exempt airline agree-
ments from the antitrust laws shows that Congress was aware that such agree-
ments do facilitate cartel actions, but that, in common with labor unions, farmer
marketing organizations, etc., they are deemed desirable in some significant sense.
"1 CAB Press Release No. 68-81 (July 26, 1968).
"6 CAB Order No. 68-7-138 (July 26, 1968).
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maximum hourly aircraft movements at the John F. Kennedy,
LaGuardia and Newark airports (in the New York area), at the
Chicago-O'Hare International Airport, and at the Washington
National Airport." Using the CAB's authority to discuss the air-
port congestion problem, the airlines proposed allocating the
FAA's quotas through scheduling committees comprised of all
U.S. and foreign carriers serving the five airports, and on December
3, 1968, the CAB approved the three airline agreements that
established the scheduling committees for the three geographic
areas. 8 It took the airlines until the end of March 1969 to reach
agreement on the actual allocations of the FAA's quotas, and
these allocations went into effect on June 1, 1969.' There have
been some adjustments in the FAA quotas, and they have been
suspended at Newark and partially suspended at John F. Kennedy,
but as this is being written, they are still in effect and the most
recent CAB order approving the existence of the airline sched-
uling committees extends through October 24, 19731"° Overall,
there seems to be every reason to expect that these committees
will continue to be authorized and to function for the indefinite
future. In fact, the last three Board orders authorizing their con-
tinuation were issued by the Board's staff under delegated au-
thority, indicating a routinization of this matter."'
This general type of capacity agreement which allocates flight
frequencies at specific airports (or over the airways in general)
has been used in three other situations. First, it was used in April
1970 to reduce schedules nationwide during the FAA air traffic
controllers' "sick-out."'" Second, it has been used at various times
since April 1970 to allow carriers serving the Chicago-O'Hare
17 The Wall Street Journal, Aug. 19, 1968, at 3 (Midwest ed.); The Wall
Street Journal, Sept. 5, 1968, at 2 (Midwest ed.).
1 CAB Order No. 68-12-11 (December 3, 1968); FAA Amendment No.
93-13 to the Federal Aviation Regulations, 33 FED. REG. 17896 (1968).
19 34 FED. REG. 2603 (1969); Av. WEEK & SPACE TECHONLOGY, Mar. 3, 1969,
at 22; Av. WEEK & SPACE TECHNOLOGY, Mar. 31, 1969, at 26. Among other
things, a 31-day meeting was held in Washington in the course of hammering out
the agreements.
2 CAB Orders Nos. 69-7-99 (July 18, 1969), 70-3-140 (March 27, 1970),
70-11-112 (November 23, 1970), 71-10-23 (October 6, 1971), 72-11-72 (No-
vember 16, 1972).
21 CAB Orders Nos. 70-11-112 (November 23, 1970), 71-10-23 (October 6,
1971), 72-11-72 (November 16, 1972).
21 CAB Orders Nos. 70-4-5, at 3 (April 2, 1970), 70-4-52 (April 10, 1970).
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International Airport to discuss specific flights to be transferred
from O'Hare to Midway airport in order to provide service im-
provements at Midway." Finally, starting in January 1971, all
U.S. and foreign carriers utilizing the International Arrivals Build-
ing at John F. Kennedy Airport have been allowed to hold dis-
cussions and enter into joint arrangements to limit the number of
passengers arriving at this building to no more than 2,500 per
hour during the summer months in order to reduce congestion in
customs clearance.
24
B. Agreements Concerning City Pairs
1. Hawaiian.
The development of capacity agreements concerning individual
city pairs began in April 1970 with the start of the Hawaiian
Service Investigation. In its order instituting this case the Board
noted that "it may well be that voluntary action on the part of
the carriers to tailor their schedules more closely to the available
traffic volume would eliminate the problem of submarginal load
factors, and with it the need for the present investigation."' Two
months later, in his Initial Decision in this case, Examiner Shapiro
recommended a halt to the "capacity war" and "urged that the
carriers consult under Board sanction, which would provide im-
munity from anti-trust violations.""6 Just one month following this
invitation, Aloha and Hawaiian requested and received permission
to engage in scheduling discussions." To date, the Board has
approved two agreements by Aloha and Hawaiian to reduce flight
frequencies in four major Hawaiian city pairs. The first agreement
resulted in 1970-71 Fall/Winter schedules being reduced by about
30 percent from the Fall 1969 level.2" The second agreement pro-
vided for Hawaiian to "decrease its proposed Fall 1971 schedules
SCAB Orders Nos. 70-4-40 (April 8, 1970), 70-7-123 (July 27, 1970),
70-10-94 (October 20, 1970), 72-10-85 (October 26, 1972), 73-4-79 (April 19,
1973).
'
4 CAB Orders Nos. 71-1-55 (January 12, 1971), 72-1-39 (January 13, 1972),
72-12-54 (December 13, 1972).
25 CAB Order No. 70-4-81 (April 16, 1970), as quoted in CAB Press Release
No. 70-52 (April 24, 1970).
2 6 Av. WEEK & SPACE TECHNOLOGY, June 29, 1970, at 33, reporting on Initial
Decision in Doc. No. 20244 (June 22, 1970).
"CAB Order No. 70-7-120 (July 24, 1970).
28 CAB Order No. 70-12-46, at 3 (December 8, 1970).
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by four daily one-way flights ... in one or more of the four major
markets," and for Aloha to add four daily flights in those city
pairs.' Amendment 1 to the second agreement provided for the
1972 summer flight frequencies to equal those operated in 1971,
but with Aloha increasing and Hawaiian decreasing frequencies
by "28 weekly segment flights in the 'four major markets'" so
that Aloha would operate 43.1 percent of the total schedules and
Hawaiian 56.9 percent."' The order approving this amendment
also authorized Aloha and Hawaiian to engage in discussions
regarding the implementation of the agreement, and specified that
it would be effective through July 15, 1973."
2. Transcontinental.
Another attempt was made in mid-1970 to implement a capacity
agreement concerning specific city pairs. During August 1970
American, TWA, and United met privately and agreed to limit
the nonstop available seat-miles that they would operate in 15 city
pairs. It happened, however, that they failed to obtain CAB per-
mission to hold their discussions and they did not provide for a
Board observer to be present (a requirement of all CAB-author-
ized discussions). For these and other reasons, on November 6,
1970, the Board refused to approve their agreement."
The efforts of these carriers were not entirely wasted since, in
its denial order, the Board noted the apparent failure of unilateral
carrier decisions to resolve the over-capacity problem in the short-
run, and it invited all carriers to apply for permission to conduct
multicarrier discussions aimed at reducing "capacity in markets
in which excess capacity is presently being operated."3" In response
to this invitation, TWA applied for permission to meet with other
2 CAB Order No. 71-8-58, at 1 (August 12, 1971). CAB Order No. 71-6-124
(June 24, 1971) gave permission to Aloha and Hawaiian to discuss schedules
which resulted in this agreement.
"CAB Order No. 71-12-143, at 2 (December 30, 1971). This amendment
also provided for increasing schedules in 1972 if necessary to maintain the com-
bined load factor of 58.1 percent experienced during the summer of 1971, with
Aloha operating the first 28 of any such additional flights, and both carriers shar-
ing any schedule increases over 28 on a 50-50 basis.
" Id. at 3. See also CAB Order No. 73-6-91 (June 22, 1973) which authorized
discussions to extend or revise the agreement.
I CAB Order No. 70-11-35 (November 6, 1970). Vice Chairman Gillilland
dissented from this decision. See also CAB Order No. 70-9-42 (September 8,
1970).
" CAB Order No. 70-11-35, at 4 (November 6, 1970).
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airlines to discuss capacity agreements, and on March 11, 1971,
the Board authorized all certificated carriers "to conduct discus-
sions to determine whether to request authority to discuss capacity
reduction agreements in specific markets. . . .,3 These discussions
were held on March 22, 1971, and resulted in an application to the
Board requesting approval for further discussions concerning the
schedules in 18 city pairs. In mid-May the Board authorized such
discussions for 13 of the 18 requested city pairs,"8 and, finally, after
still more meetings American, TWA, and United filed an agree-
ment in late June proposing a reduction in the number of weekly
nonstop flights operated in four city pairs-New York/Newark-
Los Angeles, New York/Newark-San Francisco, Chicago-San
Francisco, and Washington/Baltimore-Los Angeles." Their pro-
posed reductions from the then actual schedule levels are sum-
marized in Table No. 1. The CAB approved their agreement on
August 19, 1971, thereby establishing what has come to be known
as the "transcontinental capacity agreement.""
TABLE No. 1
ACTUAL AND PROPOSED NUMBER OF EQUIVALENT* ROUND-TRIP
NONSTOP FLIGHTS FOR THE TRANSCONTINENTAL CITY PAIRS
JUNE 1, 1971, AND OCTOBER 1, 1971 TO SEPTEMBER 16, 197238
Total Weekly Round-Trip Nonstop Flights*
City Pair Actual as of 10/1/71 to 5/31/72 6/1/72 to 9/16/72
June 1, 1971 Pro- % Re- Pro- % Re-
posed No. duction posed No. duction
NY-LA 185 132 28.9% 157 15.4%
NY-SF 143 89 38.0 121 15.7
CHI-SF 147 105 28.6 126 14.3
WASH-LA 73 66 10.2 69 6.1
* In terms of conventional jet flights. One wide-bodied jet flight was considered
equivalent to two conventional jet flights.
The expressed aim of this agreement was to increase load fac-
tors in these city pairs from the first quarter 1971 levels of 26 to
34CAB Order No. 71-3-71, at 5 (March 11, 1971).
CAB Order No. 71-5-68 (May 14, 1971).
86 CAB Agreement No. 22496, Doc. No. 22908 (effective October 1, 1971),
Agreements Filed with the Civil Aeronautics Board Under Section 412(a) During
the Week Ending June 24, 1971, at 1.
"
7 CAB Order No. 71-8-91 (August 19, 1971).
81 Id. at 2.
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36 percent, to an overall average of around 50 percent in the
October-May period and up to 60 percent during the June-
September 1972 peak period." This goal was essentially achieved.
During the first six months of the agreement the combined load
factor for the four city pairs was 49.8 percent, and the first
twelve months gave a combined load factor of 54.2 percent-
implying a load factor for the second six months of about 59
percent."0
Given this improved load factor performance, it is understand-
able why, on May 19, 1972, TWA petitioned the CAB for per-
mission to undertake further discussions regarding scheduling in
these four city pairs."' This permission was granted on August 9,
1972,' and the three carriers immediately filed an "amendatory
agreement," proposing a continuation of their existing agreement at
the same capacity levels specified for the October 1, 1971 to
May 31, 1972 off-peak period.' The Board approved this agree-
ment for the period ending April 28, 1973, but in its order it
stated that "the applicants should be on notice that no further
extension of their capacity limitation agreement will be approved,
absent a change in circumstances of extraordinary proportions.""
Apparently extraordinary changes did occur, because on April
24, 1973, the Board granted the three carriers permission to hold
discussions regarding the extension of this agreement, saying, "it
is the Board's tentative view that, contrary to our earlier determi-
nation and as discussed above, such agreements properly consti-
19 Id. at 1.
40Timm, member, concurring, at 8, CAB Order No. 72-11-6 (November 2,
1972); and CAB Order No. 73-4-98, app. A (April 24, 1973). Note that the
capacity agreement was temporarily suspended during the last two weeks of the
twelve month period. Appendix A also shows that departures were reduced 25.9
percent and seats reduced 25.4 percent during the period 10/l/71-9/30/72 as
compared with the prior twelve months. The Board correctly points out that these
results were with reduced seating configurations with lounges in wide-bodied air-
craft and five-abreast coach seating in some conventional jets. CAB Order No.
72-8-42, at 2, n.7 (August 9, 1972).
41 The Wall Street Journal, May 22, 1972, at 13 (Pac. ed.).
42 CAB Order No. 72-8-42 (August 9, 1972). Members Minetti and Murphy
dissented from this decision.
I' CAB Agreement No. 22496-Al, Doc. No. 22908, Agreements Filed with
the Civil Aeronautics Board Under Section 412(a) During the Week Ending
August 17, 1972, at 1.
4CAB Order No. 72-11-6, at 6 (November 2, 1972). Members Minetti and
Murphy dissented from this decision.
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tute a useful regulatory tool that should not be discarded for
theoretical reasons. In light of this revised position of the Board,
carriers may wish to file applications for permission to discuss
capacity agreements in other markets.' '' American, TWA, and
United filed a new capacity agreement in late May 1973." This
agreement differed from the previous agreements in that it allocated
capacity on the basis of the number of seats (rather than flights)
to be operated. 7 As of the end of July 1973, the Board had yet to
announce publicly its decision regarding this agreement.
3. New York/Newark-San Juan.
Another of the 13 city pairs where the Board's May 14, 1971,
order allowed carriers to discuss schedule agreements was New
York/Newark-San Juan. It happened, however, that American,
Eastern, and Pan American were unable to reach an agreement
until the following May,"8 after they had reportedly fought a
"capacity war" allegedly started by American when it gained entry
into this city pair by merging with Trans Caribbean in March
1971." Table No. 2 summarizes the allocation of equivalent round-
trip flights specified in this agreement. The CAB approved the
agreement on June 16, 1972, and mentioned in particular that it
would help maintain the low yield in this city pair (4.1 lc per mile
vs. 6.01c for overall domestic traffic) which the Board felt was
I CAB Order No. 73-4-98, at 4 (April 24, 1973). Footnote 8 of this order
amplified this statement as follows: "If the carriers do not come forward with
additional applications for capacity discussions, the Board may, in the discharge
of its regulatory responsibilities, suggest those markets where capacity agreements
would be warranted." Members Minetti and Murphy concurred with the result,
but not with the "speaking portion" of this order. There was a significant change
in Board membership between November 1972 and April 1973. Chairman Secor
D. Browne resigned and Robert D. Timm became chairman on March 1, 1973.
This left the Board with only four members during this period.
48 CAB Agreement No. 23703, Doc. No. 22908, Agreements Filed with the
Civil Aeronautics Board Under Section 412(a) During the Week Ending May 24,
1973, at 1.
47Av. WEEK & SPACE TECHNOLOGY, June 4, 1973, at 36.
48 CAB Agreement No. 23055, Doc. No. 22908, Agreements Filed with the
Civil Aeronautics Board Under Section 412(a) During the Week Ending May 11,
1972, at 1. The CAB authorized the specific discussions resulting in this agree-
ment in Orders Nos. 72-1-86 (January 25, 1972), 72-4-127 (April 24, 1972).
Members Minetti and Murphy dissented from these decisions.
4 9 Av. WEEK & SPACE TECHNOLOGY, Jan. 10, 1972, at 29-30. See also CAB,
AnR CARRIER FINANCIAL STATISTICS, XX-3, at 30 (1972).
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particularly important due to Puerto Rico's "unique dependence
on air transportation."5
TABLE No. 2
PROPOSED NUMBER OF EQUIVALENT* ROUND-TRIP NONSTOP FLIGHTS
TO BE OPERATED BY AMERICAN, EASTERN, AND PAN AMERICAN
BETWEEN NEW YORK/NEWARK AND SAN JUAN
AUGUST 1 TO OCTOBER 28, 1972"'
Total Weekly Round-Trip Nonstop Flights*
Peak Period Off-Peak Period
Carrier (8/1/72 to 9/9/72) (9/10/72 to 10/28/72)
Number % of Total Number % of Total
American 77.6 35% 52.5 35%
Eastern 82.0 37 55.4 37
Pan American 62.0 28 42.0 28
Total 221.6 100 149.9 100
* In terms of conventional jet flights. The following weights were used to con-
vert flights operated with other aircraft into conventional jet flights:
B-727-100 = 0.8 DC-8 Series 60 = 1.4
B-727-200 = 0.9 DC-10/L-1011 = 1.7
B-707/DC-8 = 1.0 (conventional) B-747 = 2.5
The aim of the three carriers was to achieve a 75 percent load
factor during the peak period and a 65 percent load factor for
the off-peak period. 2 As in the case of the transcontinental capacity
agreement, this goal was quickly achieved. The combined load
factor in this city pair was 74 percent in August and 66 percent
in September 1972 (compared with 60 percent and 50 percent for
these two months in 1971)." Not surprisingly, Pan American
applied for authorization to engage in discussions to extend the
agreement and, on September 5, 1972, the Board gave the three
carriers permission to do so for the period ending April 28, 1973
(the same as for the transcontinental capacity agreement)." The
new agreement was submitted to the Board at the end of September,
1 CAB Order No. 72-6-70, at 2 (June 16, 1972). Members Minetti and
Murphy dissented from this decision.
11Av. WEEK & SPACE TECHNOLOGY, Feb. 21, 1972, at 29; CAB Order No.
72-6-70, at 1 n.1 (June 16, 1972); Telephone conversation with Mr. Wayne Wat-
kins, Office of Plans, CAB (March 13, 1973).
52 CAB Order No. 72-6-70, at 2 (June 16, 1972).
5 CAB Order No. 72-11-7, at 3, n.4 (November 2, 1972).
54CAB Order No. 72-9-13 (September 5, 1972). Members Minetti and Mur-
phy dissented from this decision.
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1972," and it was approved on November 2, 1972, to become
effective on December 15, 1972." Here again, the then current
Board implied that this would be the final extension of this agree-
ment, but on March 9, 1973, the three carriers were given per-
mission to engage in renewed capacity reduction discussions."
They submitted a new agreement in early May," and, as in the
case of the Transcontinental agreement, no public announcement
of the CAB's decision has been made as of the end of July 1973."
C. Summary
In all, the CAB has approved seven capacity agreements-four
concerning airport or air traffic control problems and three con-
cerning city pairs. Agreements have been sought for other city
pairs, but without success." The CAB has shown little reluctance
in authorizing the airport type agreements, but when approving
the various city pair agreements prior to March 1973, the Board
collectively and individually expressed the hope that these agree-
ments would be only temporary, and that a return to "competitive"
scheduling would soon be feasible."' Also, Members Minetti and
Murphy generally dissented from the decisions regarding the trans-
continental and the New York/Newark-San Juan agreements on
the grounds that they reduced competition among the airlines
serving each city pair."
ICAB Agreement No. 23055-Al, Doc. No. 22908, Agreements Filed with
the Civil Aeronautics Board Under Section 412 (a) During the Week Ending
September 28, 1972, at 1.
" CAB Order No. 72-11-7 (November 2, 1972). Members Minetti and Mur-
phy dissented from this decision.
"'CAB Order No. 73-3-30 (March 9, 1973). Member Minetti dissented from
this decision.
"1 CAB Agreement No. 23672, Doc. No. 22908, Agreements Filed with the
Civil Aeronautics Board Under Section 412(a) During the Week Ending May 10,
1973, at 1.
" CAB, Weekly Summary of Orders and Regulations (July 23-28, 1973).
"For example, in September 1972, Alaska Airlines requested authority to
discuss capacity reductions with Western and Northwest in the Seattle-Anchorage
nonstop city pair. Av. WEEK & SPACE TECHNOLOGY, Sept. 18, 1972, at 27. This
application was dismissed by the Board (under delegated authority) in CAB
Order No. 72-12-82 (December 18, 1972).
"See, e.g., CAB Order No. 71-8-58, at 2, n.5 (August 12, 1971); CAB Order
No. 71-8-91, at 5 (August 19, 1971), and Minetti, Member, Concurring and
Dissenting at 1; CAB Order No. 72-6-70, at 3-4 (June 16, 1972).
"See their dissents to the orders listed in notes 42, 44, 48, 50, 54, 56, and
57, supra.
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Only time will tell whether the city-pair type capacity agree-
ments are indeed temporary, or whether the Board will continue
the revised policy adopted in March 1973 of encouraging the use
of capacity agreements to solve various airline problems. On the
other hand, there is presently no reason to expect that the airport
type capacity agreements will be allowed to lapse. So long as any
type capacity agreements exists, however, some output will be
allocated among carriers and thus a fundamental imperfection of
the present airline cartel will be reduced.
III. EFFECTS OF CAPACITY AGREEMENTS
At least three relevant questions can be asked about the effects
of capacity agreements. First, do they actually succeed in signifi-
cantly reducing flight frequencies? Secondly, to what extent do the
different provisions of various capacity agreements affect airline
performance? Lastly, does the adoption of capacity agreements
result in airlines increasing their use of still other types of rivalry?
A. Flight Frequency Reduction
There is little doubt that capacity agreements do indeed limit
flight frequencies. Some evidence is provided by airport activity
data. The FAA's High Density Rule, and the associated airport
capacity agreements, went into effect at the five large airports on
June 1, 1969, so that the total number of departures scheduled
by U.S. carriers for the 12 months ended June 30, 1969, reflects
unrestrained operations for 11 months, while similar data for the
12 months ended June 30, 1970, are for a period entirely covered
by quota restrictions. Table No. 3 shows that the five airports
having capacity agreements had changes in scheduled departures
ranging from minus 10.1 percent to plus 5.2 percent, while "all
other large hubs" in the 48 contiguous states had a 5.4 percent
increase in fiscal year 1970 over fiscal year 1969. Of course, other
things occurred that reduced schedules during fiscal year 1970,"a
but these reductions, or relatively small increases, in schedules do
",For example, wide-bodied aircraft were introduced in January 1970, in-
creasing numbers of stretched aircraft were operated, and the "sick-out" of FAA
air traffic controllers occurred in March and April of 1970. CAB, HANDBOOK OF
AiRLINE STATISTICS 517 (1971); CAB Order No. 70-4-5 (April 2, 1970).
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indicate that the FAA's quotas and the associated capacity agree-
ments had some effect in reducing flight frequencies. "4
TABLE No. 3
DEPARTURES SCHEDULED BY U.S. CARRIERS IN SYSTEM OPERATIONS
AT AIRPORTS OPERATING UNDER THE FAA HIGH DENSITY RULE
12 MONTHS ENDED JUNE 30, 1969 AND 19705
Departures Scheduled
Airport During 12 Months Ended June 30, Percent
1969 1970 Change
Chicago-O'Hare 291,418 298,730 2.5%
John F. Kennedy 145,565 130,915 -10.1
La Guardia 111,894 117,760 5.2
Newark 85,566 84,952 - 0.7
Washington National 109,397 106,509 - 2.6
Total-5 Airports 743,840 738,866 - 0.7
All Other Large Hubs 1,651,957 1,740,978 5.4
Clearer evidence that capacity agreements do reduce schedule
frequencies is available from the transcontinental capacity agree-
ment. As already mentioned, the CAB reported that 25.9 percent
fewer departures were operated in the four city pairs during the
12 months ended September 30, 1972, than during the preceding
12 months ended September 30, 1971 (immediately prior to the
effective date of this agreement).6 More detailed evidence is pre-
sented in Table No. 4 which gives the number of weekly one-way
flights scheduled in these city pairs by each of the three carriers on
selected dates. The schedules for June 1, 1971, represent the pre-
agreement base period; those for September 1, 1972, the final
period under the original agreement; those for September 16 to
October 28, 1972, the period when the agreement was temporarily
64 The FAA reported a 46.5 percent reduction in delays in the first half of fis-
cal year 1970 over the first half of fiscal year 1969 for the five airports covered
by its quotas. Dept. of Transportation, Fourth Annual Report, Fiscal Year 1970
73 (1971).
65 CAB/FAA, AIRPORT ACTIVITY STATISTICS OF CERTIFICATED ROUTE AIR
CARRIERS (12 Months Ended June 30, 1969), at 291-92; (12 Months Ended
June 30, 1970), at 295-96.
66 A total of 36,198 departures were operated in the four city pairs during the
twelve months ended September 30, 1972, while 48,854 departures were operated
in the previous twelve months. CAB Order No. 73-4-98, app. A (April 24, 1973).
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suspended; and, finally, the schedules for November 1 and 15,
1972, represent the period essentially following the Board's ap-
proval of the extension of the agreement." These data show that
150 fewer weekly one-way flights were scheduled in the four city
pairs on September 1, 1972, than on June 1, 1971, thereby indi-
cating a 13.7 percent reduction in flights if one makes the as-
sumption that there would have been no "natural" growth in
schedules over this fourteen-month period. Similarly, there were
75 (about 8.7 percent) fewer weekly flights scheduled in Novem-
ber 1972 (after the agreement was extended) than during the
September 16-October 28, 1972, period of unrestrained scheduling.
TABLE No. 4
NUMBER OF EQUIVALENT' ONE-WAY NONSTOP FLIGHTS SCHEDULED
IN THE TRANSCONTINENTAL CITY PAIRS
BY AIRLINE, DIRECTION, REGULARITY, AND AIRCRAFT TYPE
SELECTED DATES, 1971-19728
Weekly One-Way Nonstop Flightsa Scheduled
Date Air- EB/WBb Daily Wide-Bodied EB/WBb Daily Wide-Bodied
Line Number No. % No.a % Number No. % No., %
A. NY-LA B. NY-SF
6/1/71' AAL 70/75 140 96.6 84 57.9 41/48 77 86.5 56 62.9
TWA 63/63 126 100.0 84 66.7 49/49 98 100.0 56 57.1
UAL 49/49 98 100.0 28 28.6 49/49 98 100.0 28 28.6
Total 182/187 364 98.6 196 53.1 139/146 273 95.8 140 49.1
9/1/72 AAL 62/56 112 94.9 84 71.2 39/39 70 89.7 56 71.8
TWA 52/52 84 80.8 84 80.8 41/41 70 85.4 56 68.3
UAL 46/46 49 53.3 60 65.2 41/41 42 51.2 56 68.3
Total 160/154 245 78.0 228 72.6 121/121 182 75.2 168 69.4
67 Minor schedule adjustments frequently occur during various schedule per-
iods. To avoid complications resulting from such changes, the schedules in effect
at the specified dates are used to represent the entire period. There were no non-
stop schedule changes in the four city pairs during the period from September 16
through October 28, 1972. Minor adjustments occurred from October 29 to No-
vember 1, 1972, but even though the CAB did not officially approve the schedule
agreement extension until November 2, all carriers complied with the agreement
as of October 29, 1972. Finally, it should be recognized that there is about a
three-week lead time between the finalization of schedules and their publication
in the OFFICIAL AIRLINE GUIDE. For example, the September 15, 1972 schedules
were in the hands of the GUIDE before noon, August 22, while the October 29,
1972 schedules were delivered prior to noon, October 9, 1972. See p. 6 in both
the September 15 and November 1 editions of the OFFICIAL AIRLINE GUIDE.
"
8 OFFICIAL AIRLINE GUIDE (Quick Ref. N.Am. ed.), for the indicated dates
in the table.
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4 In terms of conventional jet flights. One wide-bodied jet flight was consid-
ered equivalent to two conventional jet flights. Thus, the actual number of sched-
ules operated with wide-bodied aircraft was one-half the number shown.
b Eastbound/Westbound.
I June 4, 1971, for American.
d The Official Airline Guide shows two flights (Nos. 131 and 135) operated
by United in this city pair at almost identical times. United has advised that this
was an error in the OAG and that flight No. 131 was not operated in this city
pair on these dates.
0 Effective November 18, 1972, American added one eastbound, conventional
jet schedule, thereby bringing its eastbound services to 23 flights and filling its
full quota of schedules. This added flight converted a six-day-per-week service
into a daily operation which brought American's total flights scheduled daily to
42, or 95.4 percent of all flights scheduled.
Similar data for the New York-San Juan capacity agreement
are given in Table No. 5. This table shows that a total of 513.8
one-way flights per week (in terms of equivalent conventional
jets) were scheduled in this city pair as of June 15, 1972. The
implementation of the capacity agreement on August 1, 1972,
resulted in 73.6 fewer weekly flights being scheduled during the
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agreement's peak period for a 14.3 percent reduction. The sus-
pension of the original agreement saw an increase of 11.6 one-way
flights per week during November over the number scheduled in
the off-peak October period of the agreement, and the first part
of December saw this extra number increased to 35.4 one-way
flights per week. These were 3.9 and 11.9 percent, respectively,
over the October agreement level, and they occurred even though
it was known by November 2 that the CAB had approved an
extension of the agreement effective December 15, 1972.
TABLE No. 5
NUMBER OF EQUIVALENT' ONE-WAY NONSTOP FLIGHTS SCHEDULED
BETWEEN NEW YORK/NEWARK AND SAN JUAN





AAL 91 / 91
EAL 95.9/ 95.9
PAA 70 / 70
Total 256.9/256.9
AAL 77 / 77
EAL 81.1/ 81.1
PAA 62 / 62
Total 220.1/220.1
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3/ 1/730 AAL 66 / 66 52.5 39.8 100 75.8
EAL 71.7/ 71.7 101.5 70.8 102 71.1
PAA 52 / 52 35 33.6 80 76.9
Total 189.7/189.7 189 49.8 282 74.3
'See the footnote to Table No. 2 for the weights used to convert all aircraft
types to B-707/DC-8 equivalents.
b Southbound/Northbound.
'The actual number of wide-bodied jet schedules operated was 40% (AAL
and PAA) or 59% (EAL) of the number of conventional jet schedules given in
this column.
d A peak period of the capacity agreement.
'An off-peak period of the capacity agreement.
Tables Nos. 4 and 5 also show that Eastern and United were
the most aggressive of the five carriers in increasing schedules
when the agreements were temporarily suspended. Taking all four
city pairs of the transcontinental agreement together, it can be
seen that United scheduled 40 excess one-way flights per week,
compared with TWA's 24 and American's net of 12 (14 flights
over in two city pairs and two flights under in one pair). Thus
United scheduled almost 53 percent of the net excess flights. In
the case of New York-San Juan, Pan American complied with
the previous agreement throughout the period from October 29
to December 14, 1972. American, on the other hand, scheduled
an average of six excess flights per week over the off-peak agree-
ment level, while Eastern scheduled 5.8 such flights during Novem-
ber and 29.4 flights during the first two weeks of December.
Overall, the data are quite consistent in showing that this type
of city pair capacity agreement has effectively reduced schedule
frequencies in individual city pairs. In addition, they indicate that
some carriers are constrained more than others by the agreements.
B. Airline Performance
Capacity agreements affect airline performance in more ways
than simply reducing flight frequencies. One factor that is influenced
is schedule regularity. Information given in Tables Nos. 4 and 5
show that agreements result in decreases in the percentage of total
flights operated daily (that is, seven days each week with no
change in equipment type or schedule times). Prior to the imple-
mentation of the capacity agreements almost all flights in the five
city pairs were scheduled to operate seven days a week. In addi-
tion, during the month and a half when the transcontinental
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capacity agreement was suspended this scheduling practice was
resumed by all carriers in all city pairs with just one exception
(American, in the Washington/Baltimore-Los Angeles city pair).
Under the capacity agreement, in contrast, daily service on all
schedules occurred only in the Chicago-San Francisco city pair,
while the other city pairs were characterized by schedule irregu-
larities. Thus it appears that flight schedules are more closely
tailored to weekly traffic variations under the capacity agreements
than when there are no agreements.'
A second factor is the extent to which the use of wide-bodied
aircraft has been influenced by the capacity agreements. Table
No. 4 shows that the absolute use of wide-bodied aircraft was
largely unaffected by the transcontinental agreement. American
and TWA scheduled the same number of flights with such air-
craft on June 1, 1971, (before the agreement became effective)
as on September 1, 1972, (at the end of the agreement). United
essentially doubled its use of wide-bodied jets between these two
dates, but its use of such aircraft was obviously limited during
the first period, while by the second it had achieved rough parity
with American and TWA in this respect. A similar comparison
between the schedules for the September 16-October 28, 1972
period, (when the capacity agreement was temporarily suspended)
and the November schedules (after the agreement was reinstated)
again shows very little absolute change in the use of wide-bodied
jets. Both of these cases indicate that schedule adjustments re-
sulting from this capacity agreement have mainly affected the
amounts of service offered with conventional jets.
The pattern differs under the New York-San Juan agreement.
Table No. 5 shows that Pan American's use of wide-bodied
(B-747) aircraft was reduced from 100 percent as of July 15,
1972, (just prior to the agreement) to as low as 54.2 percent
70 Similar fluctuations in weekly schedules characterized the operations of the
California intrastate carriers between 1949 and 1965 when there was little regu-
lation of intrastate service in contrast to the CAB's extensive regulation of inter-
state airlines. Thus in terms of scheduling, an important similarity in airline per-
formance exists under very limited regulation and under the most extensive regu-
lation practiced to date. Significant differences have existed, however, in other
performance areas. For example, the coach fares per mile of CAB-regulated
airlines have been as much as twice as high as those of the California intrastate
carriers. See W. JORDAN, AIRLINE REGULATION IN AMERICA: EFFECTS AND IM-
PERFECTIONS 109-13, 206-9 (1970).
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(from mid-September to mid-December when PAA operated at
its off-peak levels as established by the agreement). American
was somewhat less influenced by the agreement, but it can be seen
that during the off-peak period from September 10 through
October 28, 1972, its use of B-747s did fall to the lowest level of
all the periods studied. Eastern, on the other hand, shows a sig-
nificant increase in the use of wide-bodied jets. Eastern's aircraft,
however, is the L-1011, which is appreciably smaller than the
B-747s operated by American and Pan American.
One reason for these performance differences seems to lie in the
various weights assigned to different aircraft in the two capacity
agreements. In the transcontinental agreement, all wide-bodied
aircraft (B-747, DC-10, and L-1011) have been counted as the
equivalent of two conventional jets," while in the New York-San
Juan agreement the DC-10 and L-1011 have weights of 1.7 and
the B-747 has a weight of 2.5." Thus the B-747 has carried an
appreciably higher penalty (in terms of a reduction in total flight
frequencies within a given allotment of conventional jet frequen-
cies) in the New York-San Juan agreement than in the trans-
continental agreement. Just the opposite has been true for the
DC-10 and L-1011. The relatively stable use of wide-bodied air-
craft in the transcontinental city pairs, the reduced use of B-747s
between New York and San Juan, and the increased use of L-101 is
in this city pair are all quite consistent with these different weights.
This indicates that the relative use of aircraft types can be sig-
nificantly influenced simply through the assignment of different
weights to various aircraft.
Additional evidence regarding the effects of capacity agree-
ments on airline performance is available from Canadian experi-
ence. Prior to 1959 Air Canada (then called Trans-Canada Air
Lines) was the only air carrier allowed to provide transcontinental
service in Canada. On February 19, 1959, the Canadian Air
Transport Board (ATB) authorized CP Air (then called Canadian
Pacific Air Lines) to operate one daily round trip between Van-
couver, Winnipeg, Toronto, and Montreal to connect its inter-
national operations conducted from Vancouver and Montreal."'
"See the note at TABLE No. 1.
"See the note at TABLE No. 2.
" ATB, Decision Serial No. 1229, at 3 (February 19, 1959).
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This highly restrictive capacity allocation was maintained until
June 14, 1967, when CP Air was allowed to increase its service to
two daily round trips."' Then, on April 1, 1969, the Air Transport
Committee (ATC) of the Canadian Transport Commission au-
thorized CP Air to expand to four daily round trips followed by
an increase to five daily round trips effective June 15, 1969."
These last two increases were made in conjunction with a new
policy which allowed CP Air to provide up to 20 percent of the
total transcontinental available seat-miles (ASM). CP Air's ASM
share was liberalized to 25 percent on January 9, 1970, with Air
Canada's share being reduced to 75 percent."' Thus between 1969
and early 1970, the type of capacity allocation was changed from
one where CP Air was assigned a specific number of flights to
one where each carrier was allowed to operate a percentage of
total ASM.
It is reasonable to expect that this change in allocation method
would have a significant effect on CP Air's performance, and this
proved to be the case. When limited to one or two daily round
trips, CP Air operated large aircraft (first turboprop Britannias
and then DC-8s)," thereby increasing its capacity and passenger
appeal within its frequency restriction. When it was allowed to
operate five daily round trips and then a specified percentage of
total ASM, CP Air began providing service mainly with small
aircraft. As of June 20, 1969, it scheduled 35 weekly round trips
between Montreal/Toronto and Vancouver-80 percent with
B-737-200s and only 20 percent (one daily round trip) with
DC-8s.7' In contrast, Air Canada operated 34 weekly round trips
in the Montreal-Vancouver city pair, and 64 between Toronto
1
4 ATB, Order No. 4751 (June 14, 1967).
15 ATC, Order No. 1969-A-45, at 2 (February 12, 1969). Calgary, Edmonton,
and Ottawa were added to CP Air's transcontinental route on February 1, 1968;
ATC, Order No. 1968-A-102, at 1 (February 1, 1968). All of these orders in-
clude a long-haul restriction requiring CP Air to serve both Montreal and Van-
couver on every transcontinental flight. The Air Transport Board was incorporated
into the Canadian Transport Commission in the form of the Air Transport Com-
mittee on September 17, 1967. See Statistics Canada, AvATON IN CANADA, 1971
37 (1972).
7
6 ATC, Order No. 1970-A-23, at 1 (January 9, 1970).
7 7 OFFICIAL AIRLINE GUIDE, C 513-15 (N.Am. ed. June, 1959), C 654-55
(N.Am. ed. June, 1961).
78 OFFICIAL AIRLINE GuIDE, 413, 662, 673-74 (Quick Ref. N.Am. ed. June 15,
1969).
1973]
JOURNAL OF AIR LAW AND COMMERCE
and Vancouver, with DC-9-30s accounting for only about 32 per-
cent of these round trips and the remainder being operated with
standard and stretched DC-8s.9
Four years later, in May 1973, CP Air had increased its fre-
quency to 55 weekly round trips between Montreal and Van-
couver, and 48 round trips in the Toronto-Vancouver pair." About
84 percent of these flights were operated with B-737-200s or
B-727-100s, while DC-8s accounted for 16 percent (nine weekly
round trips). Air Canada operated 42 Montreal-Vancouver weekly
round trips, and 38'2 round trips between Toronto and Van-
couver." Half of its Montreal-Vancouver flights and only nine
percent of its Toronto-Vancouver schedules were operated with
DC-9-30s-the remainder utilized DC-8s, L-1011s, and B-747s.
Finally, it is relevant to point out that at this time all of Air
Canada's flights were operated seven days a week while only 76
percent of CP Air's flights were operated daily.
The Canadian experience indicates that a capacity allocation
based on the number of flights operated (regardless of aircraft
size) encourages the use of larger aircraft, while an allocation
based on available seat-miles promotes the use of smaller aircraft
to increase schedule frequencies. This latter method of allocation
could also encourage a reduction in the number of seats installed
in each aircraft, assuming, of course, that seat density is not con-
trolled by the agreement. Finally, the effects of capacity limita-
tions on the tailoring of flights in response to fluctuating weekly
passenger demand is also shown in CP Air's scheduling practices
as opposed to the stable seven-days-a-week schedules of Air Can-
ada.
C. Other Types of Rivalry
Given the fundamental rivalry among carriers to obtain larger
amounts of traffic (due to the CAB's failure to assign specific
traffic shares to each carrier) it can be predicted that, following
the implementation of capacity agreements, the carriers will em-
phasize other kinds of service-quality rivalry, such as:
i. operating newer, larger, and more spacious aircraft (unless
79 Id.
00 OFFICIAL AIRLINE GumE, 451, 710, 724-26 (N.Am. ed. May 15, 1973).
81 Id.
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penalties are imposed in the agreements to discourage this).
ii. introducing faster aircraft."2
iii. providing better in-flight service (more leg room, larger
seats, better meals, more entertainment, more attractively
dressed stewardesses, and so on).
iv. improving ground service through larger and more com-
fortable terminals, faster baggage handling, more ticket of-
fices with larger staffs, etc.
These service improvements will continue until their costs en-
courage the airlines to make agreements to restrain their rivalry
in these areas-just as the International Air Transport Association
"outlawed" lounges in the economy sections of international
flights,' and, in 1958, settled the "sandwich war" by specifying
the size and contents of sandwiches to be served by the North
Atlantic carriers and then assessing fines on those who failed to
comply with its specifications."
Public statements by airline officials show that they understand
this aspect of capacity agreements. For example: "United and
TWA officials claim the (capacity) agreement benefits passengers
because it forces the carriers to intensify competition in other
areas such as inflight service. '
Substantial experimentation in in-flight services occurred during
the summer of 1972. Live entertainment was introduced with
musicians (individuals, duos, and trios), magicians, caricaturists,
wine-tasting hosts, Playboy Bunnies, and various baseball and
football players. Lounges were installed in wide-bodied aircraft
with American adding an electronic piano-bar. TWA provided a
battery-operated draw-poker machine in its B-747s, and dominos,
a popular game in Puerto Rico, were added to Pan American's
B-747 lounges on San Juan flights. Additionally, emphasis was
placed on first-run movies and up-to-the-minute musical programs
in the more traditional forms of in-flight entertainment. 8
82 In this context it is relevant to note the Board's decision to allow scheduled
airlines to hold discussions for 180 days regarding the establishment of standard
flight times or cruise speeds in order to conserve aviation fuel. CAB Order No.
73-5-123 (May 25, 1973).
13 Av. WEEK & SPACE TECHNOLOGY, Oct. 23, 1972, at 107.
84 AMERICAN AVIATION, Sept. 8, 1958, at 58.
8 5 Av. WEEK & SPACE TECHNOLOGY, Feb. 7, 1972, at 24-25.
16 Av. WEEK & SPACE TECHNOLOGY, Oct. 23, 1972, at 106. This is from a five-
page article entitled Entertainment Oflers New Potential.
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While there are many ways to practice service-quality rivalry,
it should be recognized that this rivalry can also be controlled
through the auspices of CAB regulation. The recent move to
eliminate coach lounges from wide-bodied aircraft is a prime case
in point. On January 23, 1973, the CAB authorized TWA to
reduce its New York-Los Angeles one-way fare by $10, effective
April 29, 1973." In its decision, the Board said:
If carriers providing lounge service conclude that operations with
a price differential are feasible there would, of course, be no basis
for concern on their part. If, on the other hand, these carriers
conclude that they must be competitive on price, they are free to
discontinue lounge services. In that event, the necessity for a fare
reduction would be eliminated and the present fare, which is based
upon the cost of operations without a lounge, would likely con-
tinue. The choice is, of course, up to the individual carriers.8
The opinion of American and United regarding the relative appeal
to passengers of somewhat lower prices versus higher service
quality is demonstrated by their responses to TWA's proposed
fare reduction. They both opposed TWA's proposal before the
CAB, but three weeks after the Board authorized the fare reduc-
tion they announced their decisions to remove all coach lounges
from their wide-bodied aircraft, thereby allowing all carriers to
maintain the higher fare while ending the "Great Lounge War."'"
The key to the above actions was the CAB's decision in Phase
6A (Seating Configurations) of the Domestic Passenger-Fare In-
vestigation (DPFI). Among other provisions concerning seat den-
sity, the Board decided:
6. Any carrier who operates a coach lounge may continue to
do so at the normal coach fare; however, upon a showing of an
adverse competitive impact, a non-lounge operator may establish
a lower fare at the level necessary to meet such competition, and
'7 CAB Order No. 73-1-69 (January 23, 1973). Note that the unusual three-
month delay in implementation allowed ample time for the other carriers to react
to TWA's proposal before it went into effect.
88 Id. at 4. Another example of service-quality rivalry is given in footnote 2,
p. 3 of this order: "In September of 1970, United increased its frequencies in
the market, introduced B-747 service, installed five-across coach seating in con-
ventional aircraft and launched a vigorous advertising campaign relating to these
new services. Contemporaneously, TWA introduced its Ambassador service, in-
stalled 2-plus-2 seating and likewise vigorously advertised these services."
88 The Wall Street Journal, Feb. 14, 1973, at 20 (Midwest ed.).
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which may not be matched by the lounge operator except upon a
showing of special or unusual circumstances."
The judicious use of this provision should provide an effective tool
in reducing the use of coach lounges by other carriers. Indeed, as
this is being written, American, TWA, and United are endeavoring
to use it to force Continental to remove coach lounges in the
Chicago-Los Angeles city pair, with Continental responding by
challenging the Board's policy in court."
Overall, there appears to be two countervailing forces working
in this matter. On the one hand, the control of flight frequency
aspects of service-quality rivalry results in increased emphasis
being placed on other areas of carrier rivalry. On the other hand,
to the extent these other areas concern seating configurations,
they can be limited by threatening fare reductions under the
Phase 6A decision of the DPFI. The charges to coach passengers
for liquor and for earphones to listen to the audio portion of in-
flight movies are two more examples of where the Board has
acted in this regard." Still other aspects of service-quality rivalry
are uncontrolled at this time, but it seems reasonable to expect
the CAB will act to control them should they become costly
enough to warrant such action. Of course, as these other forms
of carrier rivalry are brought under control, the imperfections of
airline regulation will be reduced even more by the gradually
increasing number of explicit and implicit airline agreements and
regulatory policies.
IV. PREDICTIONS
Should the CAB decide to prohibit capacity agreements some-
time in the future, one can predict that flight frequencies will
continue to be used as a major form of service-quality rivalry.
This, in turn, will lead to the continuation of the historical cycles
of financial crises (associated with excess capacity due to the early
and rapid introduction of excessive numbers of new aircraft) fol-
lowed by periods of relative prosperity and higher load factors as
"°CAB Order No. 72-5-101, at 41-42 (May 26, 1972).
91 CAB Order No. 73-6-4 (June 1, 1973); See also Av. WEEK & SPACE TECH-
NOLOGY, June 11, 1973, at 31.
92 Av. WEEK & SPACE TECHNOLOGY, Oct. 23, 1972, at 111.
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the more stable traffic growth catches up with the bulges in in-
creased capacity.
It is unlikely, however, that capacity agreements will be abol-
ished, so let us emphasize what will probably happen with their
continuation and expansion. In this regard, it should be recognized
that there is no need to impose the rigidities, negotiating con-
flicts, and possible scale diseconomies of capacity agreements in
all multicarrier city pairs or at all airports. Agreements covering,
say, the 200 city pairs having the largest traffic flows, or agree-
ments concerning the 20 largest airports will probably suffice to
eliminate the great majority of excess airline capacity resulting
from schedule-frequency rivalry.
Assuming the existence of whatever number of agreements is
required to effectively limit overall airline capacity, and assuming
that the agreements control flight frequencies rather than the
number of available seat-miles operated, the following predictions
can be made about the effects of such agreements:
i. There would be a reduction in the number of aircraft
operated. 3
ii. The number of flight, maintenance, and operations per-
sonnel would also be reduced.
iii. There would be an increase in airline rivalry based on oper-
ating aircraft with greater passenger appeal, providing su-
perior in-flight and ground services, and undertaking in-
creased promotional activities.
iv. Relatively more personnel and other resources would be
required to produce the new aspects of service-quality rivalry.
v. More executives, regulators, lawyers, economists, statisticians,
" The reduction would be maximized if the agreements effectively prevent
the use of existing aircraft to increase schedules in nonagreement city pairs. See
CAB Order No. 72-4-63 (April 13, 1972), regarding allegations that American,
TWA, and United transferred aircraft to nonagreement city pairs. From the car-
riers' (but not the aircraft manufacturers') viewpoint, it would be desirable to
sell surplus aircraft to foreign airlines-preferably for use on their domestic
routes rather than on international routes where they might provide increased
rivalry for certain U.S. carriers.
"These individuals would have to find employment in lower paying jobs.
Some might gravitate to the air taxi operators, perhaps to the detriment of local
service carriers, but also to the possible benefit of the certificated carriers if a more
developed air taxi network served to support and increase longer-haul traffic.
There would also be some favorable impact on the military's ability to retain
trained pilots and maintenance personnel.
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etc., would be required to negotiate and enforce the capacity
agreements.
Clearly, the indicated change of emphasis in airline rivalry would
reduce the purchase, underutilization and early retirement of very
costly aircraft, and would reduce the requirements for related
personnel, while increasing the use of other resources. Recent
experiments with live entertainment indicate that new forms of
service-quality rivalry can also be quite costly," but it is highly
unlikely that these costs would even approach the very large
savings resulting from utilizing fewer aircraft and operating per-
sonnel.
On the other hand, should capacity agreements be based on
limiting the number of available seat-miles operated, the Canadian
experience indicates that there would be an important change in
the composition of the airlines' fleets. While total capacity would
be reduced, the major impact would likely fall on wide-bodied and
stretched aircraft, while there would be an appreciable increase in
the demand for smaller aircraft (such as the Boeing 727-100).
Furthermore, there would probably be a trend toward lower-
density seating in all aircraft (thereby increasing seat-mile costs).
A similar change in fleet composition would also occur under
flight frequency agreements if relatively heavy weights were adopted
for wide-bodied aircraft in comparison with smaller aircraft. Of
course, any increase in the relative use of smaller aircraft would
lessen the reductions in flight and operating personnel that would
otherwise be achieved. Thus either an inappropriate aircraft weight-
ing system or the adoption of available seat-miles as the controlled
variable would reduce efficiencies attainable through capacity
agreements."
It should be obvious by now that capacity agreements per se
will not eliminate all service-quality rivalry among the airlines.
Turning to economic theory, we find that Professor Dewey has
foreseen this problem. He demonstrates that, in the long run,
"Another example of costly service-quality rivalry is Pan American's reduc-
ing the number of first-class seats from 58 to 38 in some B-747s in order to
install dining tables and provide gourmet, restaurant-type service. Av. WEEK &
SPACE TECHNOLOGY, July 3, 1972, at 28.
"Recall that the first transcontinental agreement reached by American, TWA,
and United (and subsequently rejected by the CAB) was based on an available
seat-mile allocation, as is their most recent agreement. CAB Orders Nos. 70-11-35
(November 6, 1970); Av. WEEK & SPACE TECHNOLOGY, June 4, 1973, at 36.
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effective cartels where profits are not pooled waste more resources
than do cartels where profits are pooled." Applying this theory to
the regulated airlines implies that with profit pooling the carriers
would have an incentive to allow the lowest-cost airlines to pro-
duce all desired output in optimum-sized aircraft without rivalry
from other carriers. This would maximize industry profits which
could then be allocated on some predetermined basis so that all
cartel members would be better off with profit pooling than they
would be without it. Given this, and assuming the CAB wants,
among other things, to increase (if not maximize) airline benefits
and efficiency, it follows that non-pooling capacity agreements will
be merely an intermediate step in the development of a more per-
fect airline cartel-in response, of course, to future crises that will
result from business cycles, rivalry from other transport modes,
advances in rival technologies, labor strife, ecological problems,
and so forth.
Let us now consider what might happen within the U.S. and
Canada should significant amounts of pooling occur in North
America. The following predictions can be made:
i. Service-quality rivalry between airlines would be eliminated.
ii. Airline profits would increase (or losses decrease) as the
airlines discovered the profit-maximizing levels and struc-
tures of service quality and fares.
iii. Load factors would rise. 8
iv. Demand for flight and ground personnel would be reduced,
as would the demand for other resources used to provide
in-flight and ground services.
v. Aircraft replacement cycles would be more moderate and,
unless frequent technological developments regularly re-
duced aircraft operating costs, these cycles would be much
longer than heretofore.
Overall, absent monopoly power on the part of resource suppliers,
the airlines should be able to maximize industry profits under an
effective pooling arrangement. Their problems would be largely
8 7 D. DEWEY, MONOPOLY IN ECONOMICS AND LAW 16 (1959).
88 "Load factors in intra-European routes have shown a steady increase this
fall, primarily due to pooling arrangements among the scheduled carriers which
permit a direct control over seat capacity. In September, industry load factor
on the European continent rose to 63.3% from 61.6% recorded in the same
month last year." Av. WEEK & SPACE TECHNOLOGY, Dec. 14, 1970, at 3 1.
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limited to operating efficiently, to foreseeing and adjusting to
demand and supply changes, and to improving and policing cartel
agreements.
Notice the qualification regarding the absence of monopoly
power on the part of resource suppliers. This is an important stipu-
lation. Actually, many resource suppliers do have monopoly
power, so the following additional predictions are relevant:
i. Airline labor unions would demand increasing shares of the
monopoly gains for their members through higher wages and
featherbedding. It follows that the Airlines Mutual Aid
Agreement regarding strikes would play an increasingly im-
portant role in airline cooperation."
ii. Aircraft manufacturers would endeavor to raise the prices
of new aircraft by more than the amounts indicated by the
increases in their unit costs due to producing fewer aircraft.
iii. Prices would increase for the use of airways (increased
taxes), airports, air terminals, petroleum products, legal
and consulting services, and so forth.
Thus there would be a general sharing of the increased airline
profits by all suppliers having some market power. (By the way,
these developments could adversely affect the position of the U.S.
in international markets-both in terms of providing airline serv-
ices and in terms of supplying new transport aircraft and other
airline equipment.)
The establishment of a really effective airline cartel would
greatly increase economic efficiency by reducing the amounts of
resources required to produce given quantities of output. At the
same time, existing airline stockholders, remaining airline em-
ployees, and some airline suppliers would be wealthier. Obviously,
most airline employees who were discharged because of the more
efficient operations would be worse off, as would other suppliers
of resources no longer purchased by the airlines. Also, passengers
and shippers would generally be worse off since service quality
would deteriorate with little or no decrease in prices.
Aircraft manufacturers would likely be hard hit by extensive
capacity agreements and by pooling. The demand for new aircraft
would be reduced, but, due to the increased airline profits per
aircraft operated, this demand would have a lower price elasticity.
"See CAB Order No. 73-2-110 (February 27, 1973).
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If new aircraft were significantly more efficient, had equal or
greater passenger appeal than existing aircraft, and if the capacity
and pooling agreements were not biased against new aircraft,
manufacturers could expect a continuation of aircraft replacement
cycles, but with fewer total sales and with the likelihood that each
cycle would be more extended and would be of much smaller
amplitude than the past three cycles. If, at the same time, manu-
facturers could organize an effective countervailing cartel they
might be able to raise prices enough to retain historical profit
levels, but this seems unlikely. Furthermore, since they are not
regulated, the manufacturers would have the additional problem
of circumventing the antitrust laws to organize their cartel.
Even though they lack market power, passengers and shippers
would not be completely defenseless in the face of an effective
airline cartel. As when dealing with any monopoly, they could
compare the relative values and prices of airline services with
those of other transport services and with the myriad of substitute
goods available in the economy. The airlines would find that they
could still sell more at lower prices, and they would still face
demand curves that shift with changes in service quality. The air-
lines would have to respond to these facts of life on the demand
side in order to maximize their profits (or minimize their losses).
Furthermore, increased efficiency in airline production means that
resources would be freed for other economic uses which, in turn,
would lower the costs and prices of goods in other industries.
Clearly, the tertiary and higher-order effects would be many and
diverse.
V. CONCLUSION
This analysis of the source, development, and effects of airline
capacity agreements has been aimed at providing a more thorough
understanding of this regulatory innovation. Perhaps it will assist
airline and CAB personnel to implement such agreements more
effectively, and it may provide a basis for interested individuals to
decide whether to support, oppose, or ignore these agreements.
Doubtless, many present airline stockholders, executives, relatively
senior employees, lawyers, etc. are delighted with the prospects of
airline capacity agreements. On the other hand, aircraft manu-
facturers (and their stockholders, employees and suppliers), other
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airline suppliers, relatively junior airline employees, and many air-
line customers have reason to oppose a widespread adoption of
capacity agreements and other moves to perfect the airline cartel.
Those who value efficiency, conservation and reduced pollution
may also applaud the results of capacity agreements." It should be
realized, however, that these desired goals can be achieved through
other institutional arrangements. For example, the essentially non-
regulated airline market structure that existed in California be-
tween 1949 and 1965 resulted in much greater efficiency on the
part of the California intrastate carriers compared with that of
the CAB-regulated airlines. The average annual load factors of
all intrastate carriers ranged from 66 to 80 percent, they utilized
their aircraft more intensively, and the output per employee of
successful carriers was as much as double that of the CAB-regulated
trunk carriers.1"1 At the same time, service quality was lower than
under CAB regulation, but passengers were compensated for this
by fares that were as much as 50 percent less than CAB-regulated
fares. 1"'
This article has also demonstrated that unless care is taken in
formulating the detailed provisions of capacity agreements, a good
deal of potential efficiency can be lost through the utilization of
less than optimal-sized aircraft and through the use of a greater
than optimal number of flight and other operating personnel.
Furthermore, it has shown that capacity agreements will not elimi-
nate all carrier rivalry, will not remove all the imperfections in
CAB regulation, and will not solve all airline problems. As diffi-
culties continue to appear (albeit in somewhat modified form)
there will be calls for still more regulation, and the logical exten-
sion of this is the eventual introduction of pooling among the
domestic carriers.
Perhaps a note of warning is an appropriate way to end this
100 " . . . [Tlhe Board said its tentative view is that capacity agreements are
an immediately effective remedy toward lessening the energy crisis and for elimi-
nating wasteful over-capacity in city-pair markets and may, in conjunction with
other Board policies, serve to dampen and ultimately reverse the 'chronic and
persistent industry-wide tendency to operate excessive capacity and the unneces-
sary operating costs associated thereunder.'" CAB Press Release No. 73-66
(April 24, 1973) regarding CAB Order No. 73-4-98 (April 24, 1973).
101 W. JORDAN, AIRLINE REGULATION IN AMERICA: EFFECTS AND IMPERFEC-
TIONS 197-220, 233-36 (1970).
102 Id. at 53-56, 109-13, 276-87.
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analysis. In an important article regarding the Interstate Commerce
Commission, Professor Hilton traced the development of railroad
regulation and the resulting railroad cartel. The following quota-
tions from this article are relevant to the long-run airline situation:
Congress responded to the temporary problems attendant upon
the end of federal control of the railroads in the (First World)
War and to the onslaught of the decline of the industry about
1915 by converting the ICC from a body devoted to facilitation
of private cartelization to an outright public cartel through the
Transportation Act of 1920. This statute provided for minimum
rate regulation, control of entry and exit, capital formation, con-
solidation, and several other normal accoutrements of a cartel.
Notably, it provided for a target rate of return of 6 per cent for
the industry ...
The Act is open to the most hostile criticism that one may lay
against any statute: it perpetuated the problem with which it was
designed to deal. In retrospect, the railroad problem of the 1880's
was a temporary and self-limiting one. The industry had attracted
enough resources that the railroads would shortly have had to
behave competitively whether they wished to do so or not. This
prospect was widely looked upon as intolerable because it prom-
ised widespread bankruptcy and a long period of outflow of re-
sources as a consequence of a chronically low rate of return. In
retrospect, these circumstances were unavoidable, once the in-
dustry began to decline.'
There is little indication today of a secular decline in the airline
industry, but who in the early 20th century foresaw the decline
of the railroads? The airline crises since the adoption of regulation
in 1938 have occurred in the context of strong secular growth
where a five percent annual increase in traffic is a bad year.
Imagine the airlines facing important problems under a situation
of modest long-run growth or even secular decline. They would,
of course, continue to turn to regulation for solutions to such
problems, and regulation can indeed provide temporary succour.
The fact is, however, that despite its short-run usefulness, regula-
tion can not counteract secular trends, and, in addition, it imposes
or allows rigidities which are particularly costly when fundamental
1 Hilton, The Consistency of the Interstate Commerce Act, 9 J. LAw &
ECON. 87, 111-12 (1966).
1973] CAPACITY AGREEMENTS 213
conditions require flexibility and many small, but painful, adjust-
ments.
Airline capacity agreements are but one step in the airlines'
development of a fully effective cartel along classic lines. Those
who promote these agreements will find it useful to be aware of
the position of capacity agreements in this broader context, and
to recognize that regulation must operate within the environment
of fundamental economic forces. If they do, it may be possible for
them to design the airline cartel so as to increase its ability to
adjust to such changes, thereby enhancing its long-term viability
and profit generating capability. At the same time, it should be
recognized that any benefits derived from an effective (or imperfect)
cartel accrue to a relatively small segment of the economy at the
expense of many individuals and organizations.

